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LOVE V. SUPERIOR COURT: 
MANDATORY AIDS TESTING 
AND PROSTITUTION 
KARIN ZINK* 
The AIDS! epidemic has brought one of our most (unda-
mental constitutional rights into sharp focus in California. The 
relationship between the Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures and the govern-
ment's ability to mandate AIDS testing was the topic of a 
recent California case, Love v. Superior Court. 2 In a unanimous 
decision the California Court of Appeal upheld section 1202.6 
of the California Penal CodeS [hereinafter § 1202.6] mandating 
AIDS testing of persons convicted of soliciting an act of pros-
titution. 4 The court held that the California law does not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
search and seizures despite the absence of a warrant, proba-
ble cause, or even individualized suspicion.6 
This case was decided against a background of recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions upholding warrantless 
government searches under the developing doctrine of "special 
needs." In limited circumstances, this doctrine provides an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable 
cause requirements.8 
This note will review the development of the "special needs" 
doctrine, analyze the Love court's application of the "special 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
1. AIDS is an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. AIDS is evi-
denced by the presence of antibodies to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in 
a person's blood. Blacks Medical Dictionary 18 (35th ed. 1987). The terms "AIDS test-
ing" and "HIV testing" will be used interchangeably in this note. 
2. 226 Cal. App. 3d 736, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1990), review denied Mar. 14, 1991. 
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (West Supp. 1992). 
4. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 746. 
5. 1d. at 743. 
6. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (war-
rantless drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees following major train accidents 
is constitutional under the "special needs" doctrine); Treasury Employees' v. Von Raab, 
489 U.S. 656 (1989) (warrantless drug testing of Customs employees upheld under the 
"special needs" doctrine); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (warrantless 
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needs" test and demonstrate how the shortcomings of the 
court's application and analysis endangers our privacy rights 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
I. HISTORY OF THE LOVE CASE: 
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: 
In 1988, the California Legislature adopted § 1202.6.7 This 
law orders AIDS testing8 and AIDS education9 for persons 
convicted of soliciting an act of prostitution in violation of 
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (West Supp. 1992) (codifying S.B. 1007 and enact-
ing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 647(0,1202.1,1202.6 and 12022.85). The third and final revi-
sion of S.B. 1007 requires that persons convicted of prostitution and various sex 
offenses submit to AIDS tests. The bill further provides for penalty enhancement for 
subsequent convictions of prostitution and sexual offenses and AIDS education for con-
victed prostitutes. S.B. 1007, 1987-88 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess., (as amended June 20,1988). 
The original version of the bill, as introduced, required only testing and penalty 
enhancement for prostitutes. S.B. 1007, 1987-88 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess., (as amended 
March 4, 1988). The second version added testing of sex offenders and the third and 
final version added AIDS education for prostitutes and penalty enhancement for sex 




8. CAL. PENAL CODE §1202.6: 
(a) Notwithstanding Section 199.20, 199.21, and 199.22 of 
the Health and Safety Code, upon the first conviction of any 
person for a violation of subdivision (b) of Section 647, the 
court shall, before sentencing or as a condition of proba-
tion, order the defendant ... to submit to testing for AIDS 
in accordance with subdivision (e). 
(b) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of a violation of 
subdivision (b) of Section 647, the court shall, before sen-
tencing, order the defendant to submit to testing for AIDS in 
accordance with subdivision (e) . 
• • • 
(e) The court shall order testing of every defendant as 
ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) for evidence of anti-
bodies to the probable causative agent of acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome. 
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(d): 
An AIDS prevention education program providing services, 
at a minimum, shall include details about the transmission 
of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the etiologic agents 
for AIDS, symptoms of the AIDS or AIDS-related condi-
tions, prevention through avoidance or cleaning of needles, 
sexual practices which constitute high risk, low risk, and no 
risk (including abstinence), and resources for assistance if the 
person decides to take the test for the etiologic agent for AIDS 
and receives a positive test. The program also shall include 
other relevant and preventative information as it becomes 
available. 
2
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section 647(b) of the California Penal Code10 [hereinafter 
§ 647(b)]. The statute directs the court to advise those 
defendants who test positive that a subsequent conviction 
under § 64 7(b) will be elevated from a misdemeanor to a felony.ll 
In addition the statute requires that the test results be sub-
mitted to the defendant,12 the court,13 and the State Department 
of Health Services. 1 •. Confidentiality of the test results is 
required by the statute15 "except that the department [of 
Health Services] shall furnish copies of any such report to a 
district attorney upon request. "16 The law does not, how-
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West Supp. 1992). This subsection requires in per-
tinent part: "Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly 
conduct, a misdemeanor: ... [IjI] (b) Who solicits, or who agrees to engage or who 
engages in any act of prostitution .... As used in this subdivision, "prostitution" 
includes any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration." 1d. 
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(c): 
If the results of the tests described in the report are positive, 
the court shall make certain that the defendant understands 
the nature and meaning of the contents of the report and 
shall further advise the defendant of the penalty estab-
lished in Section 647<0 for a subsequent violation of subdi-
vision (b) of Section 647. 
1d. CAL. PENAL CODE 647<0: 
Id. 
In any accusatory pleading charging a violation of subdivi-
sion (b) of Section 647, if the defendant has been previous-
ly convicted one or more times of a violation of that 
subdivision ... and in connection with one or more ofthose 
convictions a blood test was administered ... with positive 
test results, of which the defendant was informed, the pre-
vious conviction and the positive test results ... shall be 
charged in the accusatory pleading. If the previous convic-
tion and informed test results are found to be true by the trier 
of fact or are admitted by the defendant, the defendant is 
guilty of a felony. 
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(c): "At the sentencing hearing of a defendant 
ordered to submit to testing for AIDS pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b), the court shall 
furnish the defendant with a copy of the report submitted pursuant to subdivision (e) 
and shall direct the clerk to note the receipt of the report by the defendant in the record 
of the case." Id. 
13. CAL. PENAL CODE §1202.6(e): "Notwithstanding Section 199.21 of the Health 
and Safety Code, written copies of the report on the test shall be furnished to both of 
the following: [IjI] (1) The court in which the defendant is to be sentenced. [IjI] (2) The 
State Department of Health Services." 1d. 
14. Id. 
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(0: "Except as provided in subdivisions (c) and (g), 
the reports shall be confidential." Id. 
16. CAL. PENAL CODE §1202.6(g): "The State Department of Health Services 
shall maintain the confidentiality of the reports received pursuant to subdivision (e), 
except that the department shall furnish copies of any such report to a district attor-
ney upon request." Id. 
3
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ever, impose on the district attorney any requirement of con-
fidentiality.17 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY: 
The Petitioners were convicted in San Francisco Municipal 
Court of soliciting an act of prostitution in violation of § 
647(b).18 Upon conviction, the Petitioners were ordered to 
submit to AIDS testing pursuant to § 1202.6.19 In an attempt 
to challenge the constitutionality of the testing requirement, 
a petition for a writ of mandate was filed in Superior Court on 
behalf of Petitioners and all others similarly situated.20 Upon 
denial of the writ by the Superior Court, a petition was sub-
sequently filed in the appellate court.21 
The Petitioners' principal contention was that § 1202.6 
violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.22 The basis for the 
objection was that the mandatory testing scheme violated the 
Fourth Amendment because it authorizes a bodily intrusion for 
the removal of blood and its subsequent chemical testing in the 
absence of a warrant and probable cause.23 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. UNITED'STATES SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT: 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that the people have a right to be free from 
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6. Subsection (0 requires that the results disclosed 
pursuant to subdivision (e), (disclosed to the court and the State Department of 
Health Services), shall be confidential. Subdivisions (c) and (g) permit the disclosure 
in certain limited circumstances, (subsection (c) allows the court to disclose the 
results to the defendant and subsection (g) allows for the State Department of Health 
Services to disclose the test results to district attorney upon request.) However, 
Subdivision (0 does not require the district attorney to maintain the confidentiality 
of the test result. [d. 
18. Love v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 3d 736, 739 (1990). 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 739·40. 
21. [d. at 740. 
22. Love, 226 Cal. App. at 740. The Petitioners also argued that § 1202.6 violates 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. [d. at 747. 
Finding little merit to these arguments, the court focused its analysis of § 1202.6 under 
the Fourth Amendment. See infra notes 112·113 (brief discussion of the courts anal· 
ysis of Petitioners' other arguments.) 
23. [d. 
4
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unreasonable searches and seizures.24 The Supreme Court 
has noted that "the basic purpose of this Amendment ... is to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbi-
trary invasions by government officials. "25 In analyzing Fourth 
Amendment violations, court must make the initial determi-
nation of whether a governmental search or seizure has 
occurred.26 The Supreme Court has defined a search as a gov-
ernment action which intrudes on an individuars reasonable 
expectation ofprivacy.27 Because the Fourth Amendment does 
not proscribe all searches, but only those that are unreasonable, 
a court must then determine whether the search is reason-
able.26 The reasonableness of a search is dependant, in part, on 
[d. 
24. U.S CONST. amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to searched, and the 
persons or things to be searched. 
25. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,528 (1967). The Supreme Court 
reversed the defendants conviction for failure to allow a warrantless search of his home 
for housing code violations. [d. at 523. The Court held that area housing inspections 
were reasonable only if conducted pursuant to a warrant. [d. at 532. However, 
rather than imposing the usual probable-cause requirement, the Court held that 
probable-cause existed if there were reasonable legislative or administrative standards 
governing the inspection. [d. at 538. 
26. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). The 
court upheld FRA [Federal Railroad Administration] regulations mandating war-
rantless substance abuse testing of certain railroad employees following major rail-
road accidents. [d. at 634. Analyzing the threshold question of whether a governmental 
search or seizure has occurred, the Court stated that a compelled physical intrusion 
into the body for blood "must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search" and that the 
chemical analysis of the sample is a further privacy invasion. [d. at 616. 
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). The Court held that evidence 
of a telephone conversation obtained by use of an electronic device without a warrant 
was inadmissible. [d. at 359. The court found that a search had occurred because the 
defendant had an expectation that his conversations on a public telephone would be 
private and society recognized that expectation of privacy. [d. at 353; New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985). The Court held that the warrantless search by school 
officials of a student's property did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In finding that 
students have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court stated that "to receive 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an expectation of privacy must be one that 
society is 'prepared to recognize as legitimate'" [d. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
U.S. 517, 526 (1984». 
28. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966). The Court determined that 
a warrantless blood alcohol test was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment 
because: (1) the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant while driving 
under the influence; (2) the search was conducted incident to a valid arrest; and (3) 
the delay involved in obtaining a warrant would result in a loss of evidence. [d. at 772. 
The Court investigated the reasonableness under the circumstances of the warrant-
less search noting that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only those searches that are 
unreasonable. [d. at 768. 
5
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the type of search the government is conducting.29 There are two 
categories of governmental searches as defined by the Supreme 
Court: criminal searches and administrative searches.30 
A criminal search involves a governmental intrusion with 
the intent to procure evidence to be used in a criminal pro-
. ceeding.31 With few exceptions, a criminal search is reasonable 
only if executed pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral mag-
istrate.32 For a search warrant to be issued there must be 
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be dis-
covered.33 
An administrative search involves a governmental intrusion 
with the intent to obtain information to be used to ensure 
compliance with regulations or to protect public health and 
safety. 34 Because administrative searches address problems 
unlike those addressed in normal law enforcement activities, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that administrative search-
es generally cannot be dealt with adequately using the Fourth 
29. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (reasonableness depends on all the circumstances 
surrounding the search and the nature of the search itselO; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 
(reasonableness of a search is dependant on the context in which the search takes 
~~~ . 
30. Note, AIDS, Rape and the Fourth Amendment: Schemes for Mandatory AIDS 
Testing of Sex Offenders, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1618 (1990). 
31. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 (telephone wiretapping during police investigation 
constituted a criminal search because it was conducted to obtain evidence that Katz 
was involved in illegal activities); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757 (a blood alcohol test 
involved a criminal search because it was used to discover evidence ofintoxication for 
a drunk driving arrest). 
32. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment 
requires that a neutral and detached magistrate determines whether the evidence sup-
ports the issuance of a search warrant. Id. 
33. Id. See also U. S. CONST. amend. IV: ("no Warrants shall issue, but on prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983) (probable cause is a prac-
tical, common-sense decision by a magistrate that, given all the circumstances, there 
is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place). 
34. See Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (blood alco-
hol testing conducted pursuant to FRA [Federal Railroad Administration] regulations 
are administrative searches because they are conducted to ensure railroad safety by 
detecting substance abuse in railroad employees); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 
709 (1987) (search ofa doctor's office by state hospital officials constituted an admin-
istrative search because it was conducted to ensure the efficient operation of the work 
place); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search ofa student's property by 
school officials constituted an administrative search because it was conducted to main-
tain discipline in the school rather than to obtain evidence of criminal activity); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing inspection by an inspec-
tor of the Department of Public Health constituted an administrative search because 
it was conducted to ensure compliance with the housing code by investigating code 
violations). 
6
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Amendment's warrant and probable cause restrictions.35 As a 
result, the Court has decided that administrative searches 
must be judged by a different standard.36 
The standard for administrative searches was first artic-
ulated by the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court.37 
In holding that area housing inspections could be conducted 
pursuant to a warrant issued on less than the usual quantum 
of probable cause, the court stated that reasonableness was 
still the ultimate standard but that "there can be no ready test 
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the 
need to search against the invasion which the search 
entails. "38 
The Court noted that "[ w ]here considerations of health 
and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an infer-
ence of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly dif-
ferent from those that would justify such an inference where 
a criminal investigation has been undertaken. "39 The Court 
found that "probable cause to issue a warrant to inspect must 
exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for 
conducting the area inspection are satisfied. "40 
[d. 
35. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533: 
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation 
of a, general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement, the question is not whether the public interest 
justifies the type of search in question, but whether the 
authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which 
in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtain-
ing a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose 
behind the search. 
36. [d. at 534. 
37. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
38. [d. at 536-37. 
39. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 
(1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting». 
40. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538: 
Such standards, which will vary with the municipal pro-
gram being enforced, may be based on the passage of time, 
the nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment 
house), or the condition of the area, but they will not neces-
sarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the 
particular dwelling. 
[d. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1822.52 (West 1990): "Cause shall be deemed to 
exist if either reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting a rou-
tine or area inspection are satisfied with respect to the particular place ... , or there 
is reason to believe that a condition of nonconformity exists with respect to the par-
ticular place ...• [d. 
7
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In its application of this balancing theory, the Court 
focused on three factors in determining the reasonableness 
of the governmental inspection: (1) the history of judicial and 
public acceptance; (2) the strong public interest in com-
batting the problem; and (3) the relatively limited privacy 
invasion,4! 
The Camara42 balancing test has been applied in numerous 
contexts in California, including agricultural inspections/3 
inspection of business records for licensing,.' and regional 
water control. 46 Since Camara,46 however, the Court has 
expanded the scope of administrative searches to allow war-
rantless searches under the developing doctrine of "special 
needs" ,47 A "special needs" situation exists when the individ-
ual's privacy interests are weakened, and the governmental 
interests are concomitantly heightened causing the balance to 
41. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37: 
[T)here can be no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search against the 
invasion which the search entails. But ... a number of 
persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of 
area code-enforcement inspections. First, such programs 
have a long history of judicial and public acceptance. Second, 
the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be 
prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other can-
vassing technique would achieve acceptable results .... 
Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in 
nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they 
involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's pri-
vacy. 
1d. (citation omitted). 
42. 387 U.S. 523. 
43. See, e.g., Vidaurri v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 2d 550,91 Cal. Rptr. 704 
(1970) (inspections by the county agricultural commissioner require the issuance of 
an inspection warrant as provided in Section 1822.50 of the CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE). 
44. See, e.g., Pinney v. Phillips, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1570,281 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1991) 
(inspections of the business records of an electrical contractor requires an inspection 
warrant under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1822.50 because the business was not closely 
regulated). 
45. See, e.g., Joseph v. Masonite Corp., 148 Cal. App. 3d 6, 195 Cal. Rptr. 629 
(1983) (issuance of an inspection warrant to enter timberland and observe logging oper-
ations in order to determine whether there was compliance with water quality con-
trol provisions held constitutional). 
46. 387 U.S. 523. 
47. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
"Only in those exceptional circulllstances in which special needs, beyond the normal 
need oflaw enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement imprac-
ticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the 
Framers." 1d. See also Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 
(1989); Treasury Employees' v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989); O'Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
8
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be struck in favor of the governmental search.48 When faced 
with a "special need", courts have "not hesitated to balance the 
governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality 
of the warrant and probable cause requirements in a particu-
lar context. "49 The "special needs" doctrine has been employed 
to uphold searches in numerous contexts involving special 
circumstances, including searches of school children,50 border 
searches,51 and searches of the desks and offices of public 
employees.52 
While the "special needs" doctrine has developed in an ad 
hoc fashion, the Supreme Court helped to clarify the doctrine 
in Burger v. New York. 53 The Court found the "special needs" 
doctrine applicable to the warrantless search of an automobile 
junk yard, stating that the privacy interests of the defendant 
were reduced due to his participation in a closely regulated 
industry54 and the government interests were heightened 
because of the increased problem of vehicle theft. 55 While the 
Court struck the balance in favor of the government, it declared 
48. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,698 (1987). "Because the owner ... has a 
reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which 
fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a govern-
mental search, have a lessened application in this context." 1d. (citations omitted). "[A]s 
in other situations of "special need" where the privacy interests of the owner are weak-
ened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly 
heightened, a warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 1d. at 698-99 (citations omitted). 
49. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (the warrantless search of a probationer's home constitutional 
under "special needs"); Burger, 482 U.S. at 699-703 (the warrantless search of the 
premises of a highly regulated business was held to be constitutional under "special 
needs"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (the warrantless body cavity search 
of a prison inmate was upheld under the "special needs" doctrine). 
50. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325. In this case the Supreme Court held that the war-
rantless search of a student's purse by school officials was constitutional.1d. at 347-
48. The Court found that the need for swift and informal disciplinary procedures 
outweighed the intrusion to the students expectation of privacy. 1d. at 341. 
51. United States v. Martinez-Fuentes, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The Court was faced 
with the constitutionality of routine vehicle stops at permanent checkpoints near the 
Mexican border. 1d. The Court found that the need to safeguard our border along with 
the impracticability of obtaining a warrant justified the warrantless search. 1d. 
52. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). In Ortega, the Court held that the 
warrantless search of a state employee's office was constitutional. 1d. In balance the 
Court found that the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy was outweighed by 
the government's need for supervision, and efficient operation of the work place. 1d. 
at 725. 
53. 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
54. 1d. at 698. "[T]he owner or operator of commercial premises in a closely reg-
ulated industry has a reduced expectation of privacy." 1d. 
55. 1d. at 702. "In this day, automobile theft has become a significant social prob-
lem, placing enormous economic and personal burdens upon the citizens of different 
states." 1d. 
9
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that a warrantless search may be reasonable only upon meet-
ing three criteria:56 (1) a substantial governmental interest 
which justifies the regulatory scheme under which the search 
is conducted;57 (2) a warrantless inspection must be necessary 
to further the regulatory scheme;56 and (3) the regulatory 
scheme must serve as a constitutionally adequate substitute 
for a search warrant. 59 
Having decided that the junkyard search met these crite-
ria, the Court went on to explain that although the purpose of 
the statute was to deter criminal activity and the inspections 
were conducted by police officers, the "special needs" exception 
was still applicable because the primary purpose was not to 
obtain evidence for use in a criminal proceeding.so 
56. [d. at 699. "This warrantless inspection ... will be deemed to be reasonable 
only so long as three criteria are met." [d. 
57. [d. "[T]here must be a 'substanial' government interest that informs the reg-
ulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made." [d. The Court found that 
the state had a substantial interest in regulating the vehicle-junkyard industry 
"because motor vehicle theft has increased in the State and because the problem of theft 
is associated with this industry." [d. at 710-12. See also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 
594,602 (1981) (the government has a substantial interest in improving the health 
and safety of underground and surface mines); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-
40 (1985) (the state has a substantial interest in maintaining school security and pro-
viding an environment in which learning can take place). 
58. Burger, 482 U.S. at 699. "[W]arrantless inspections must be 'necessary to fur-
ther [the] regulatory scheme.'" [d. (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 600). The 
Court found that a warrant requirement would frustrate the statute's purpose of deter-
ring automobile theft "[b]ecause stolen cars and parts often pass quickly through an 
automobile junkyard, 'frequent' and 'unannounced' inspections are necessary in order 
to detect them." [d. at 703. See also Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600 (the warrantless mine 
inspections were necessary because forcing inspectors to obtain a warrant before each 
inspection would frustrate the purpose of the inspection by possibly alerting owners 
and operator of the mines of impending inspections); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (requir-
ing school officials to obtain a warrant before searching a student would interfere with 
the swift and informal disciplinary procedure need in schools and thus frustrate the 
government purpose behind the search); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 
(1987) (requiring a warrant before searching probationers would interfere with the pro-
bation system by substituting a magistrate for a probation officer as the judge of how 
extensively a probationer requires supervision and by causing a delay in the proba-
tion officers response to evidence of misconduct by the probationer). 
59. Burger, 482 U.S. at 699 "[T]he statute's inspection program, in terms of the cer-
tainty and regularity of its application, [must] provid[e]a constitutionally adequate sub-
stitute for a warrant" [d. (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603). The Court held that "the 
regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the 
owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and 
has a properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officer." 
[d. at 699. The Court held that this requirement was met, stating the "[t]he statute 
informs the operator of a vehicle dismantling business that inspections will be made on 
a regular basis, ... the 'time, place and scope' of the inspection is limited," and appro-
priate restraints are placed upon the discretion of the inspecting officers. [d. at 703. 
60. Burger, 482 U.S. at 704. "[A] State can address a major social problem both 
by way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions. Administrative 
10
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It was not until 1989 that the Supreme Court extended the 
scope of the "special needs" doctrine to allow warrantless 
intrusions of an individual's body.61 In two companion cases, 
Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n and Treasury Employees' 
v. Von Raab, the Court employed the "special needs" exception 
to uphold searches of an individual's body and bodily fluids. 62 
In Skinner,63 the Court upheld drug and alcohol testing of 
railroad employees following major train accidents. 64 Applying 
the "special needs" doctrine, the Court held that the privacy 
interests of the employees were reduced due to the regulation 
of the industry by the government65 and the government inter-
est was heightened due to the need to regulate the conduct of 
railroad employees to ensure the safety of the railroads.66 
Applying the three prong test laid out in Burger,67 the 
Court first found that the government had a substantial inter-
est in ensuring the overall safety of the railroads by regulat-
ing the conduct of railroad employees who engaged in safety 
sensitive tasks.68 Second, the Court found that the warrantless 
statutes and penal laws may have the same ultimate purpose of remedying the social 
problem, but they have different subsidiary purposes and prescribe different meth· 
ods of addressing the problem." ld. (emphasis in original). "So long as a regulatory 
scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the 
inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations ...• ld. at 707. See 
also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 313 (1972) (the warrantless inspection of 
a pawnshop licensed to sell firearms was constitutional despite the fact that the 
information obtained during the inspection was used to prosecute the pawnshop 
owner because the inspection was a valid administrative search. But see Sal wasser 
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Municipal Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d 223, 231, 156 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1979) 
(inspections made pursuant to CaVOSHA (California Occupational Safety and Health 
Act) subject to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement because of the 
possible penal consequences of CallOSHA). 
61. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602. 
62. ld.; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656. 
63. 489 U.S. 602. 
64. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) pro· 
mulgated regulations that mandate blood and urine tests ofrailroad employees who 
are involved in certain railroad accidents. ld. 
65. ld. at 627. "The expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished 
by reason oftheir participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure 
safety, a goal dependant, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered 
employees." ld. 
66. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628. The Court found that the government has a com· 
pelling interest in the testing of railroad employees. Stating that "[e]mployees sub· 
ject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risk of injury to others that even 
a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences." ld. 
67. 482 U.S. 691. 
68. ld. at 628. 
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inspections were necessary to further the regulatory scheme.69 
Due to the rate that drugs and alcohol are depleted from the 
bloodstream, the Court found that the delay in obtaining a war-
rant would frustrate the governmental interest.70 In addi-
tion, the warrant requirement would detract from the deterrent 
effect of the regulation, which is dependant on an effective 
testing program.71 Third, the Court found that the testing 
program served as an adequate substitute for a warrant 
because it narrowly defined the scope of the search, applied the 
testing program with regularity, and gave the inspecting offi-
cers only limited discretion. 72 
In Von Raab,73 the Court followed a similar analysis in 
upholding drug testing of customs officials who participated in 
drug interdiction or carried firearms." In its application of the 
"special needs" doctrine, the Court held that, because the cus-
toms officials in question were involved in tasks which great-
ly impacted on public safety and welfare, they had a diminished 
69. ld. at 624. The Court found that "imposing a warrant requirement in the pre-
sent context would add little to the assurances of certainty and regularity already 
afforded by the regulations, while significantly hindering, and in many cases frus-
trating, the objective of the Government's testing program." ld. 
70. ld. at 623. The Court noted that since "alcohol and other drugs are eliminated 
from the bloodstream at a constant rate, ... blood and breath samples taken to mea-
sure whether these substances were in the bloodstream when a triggering event 
occurred must be obtained as soon as possible" and therefore "the delay necessary to 
procure a warrant ... may result in the destruction of valuable evidence." ld. See also 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966). 
71. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629-30: 
[C]ustomary dismissal sanctions that threatens the employees 
who use drugs or alcohol while on duty cannot serve as an effec-
tive deterrent unless violators know that they are likely to be 
discovered. By ensuring that employees in safety-sensitive posi-
tions know they will be tested upon the occurrence of a trig-
gering event, the timing of which no employee can predict 
with certainty, the regulations significantly increase the deter-
rent effect of the administrative penalties associated with the 
prohibited conduct, concomitantly increasing the likelihood that 
employees will forgo using drugs of alcohol while subject to 
being called to duty. 
ld. (citations omitted). 
72. ld. at 622. The Court found that "[b]oth the circumstances justifying toxi-
cological testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly 
and specifically in the regulations that authorize them, and doubtless are well known 
to covered employees." ld. 
73. 489 U.S. 656. The United States Customs Service promulgated a drug 
screening program requiring urinalysis testing of employees seeking transfer or pro-
motion to positions having direct involvement in drug interdiction or the requirement 
of carrying firearms. ld. at 660-61. 
74. ld. at 679. The Court held that warrantless drug testing of certain customs 
officials was constitutional, finding that the privacy interest of covered employees was 
outweighed by the government's interest in protecting the integrity of our borders. ld. 
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expectation of privacy76 while the government had a heightened 
interest in safeguarding the borders.76 
Concluding that the testing program bore a close and sub-
stantial relation to the governmental goal,77 the Court struck 
the balance in favor of the government inspection.78 Applying 
the Burger79 three prong test, the Court concluded first that 
the government had a substantial interest,80 and second, that 
requiring a warrant would only divert agency resources81 
while providing little additional protection to the employee.82 
Third, as it found in Skinner,83 the Court decided that the test-
Id. 
75. Id. at 672: 
Customs employees who are directly involved in the inter-
diction of drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the 
line of duty ... have a diminished expectation of privacy in 
respect to intrusions occasioned by the urine test. Unlike 
most private citizens or government employees in general, 
employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should 
expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity. Much 
the same is true of employees who are required to carry 
firearms. Because successful performance of their duties 
depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these 
employees cannot reasonably expect to keep from the Service 
personal information that bears directly on their fitness. 
76. Id. at 670. "It is readily apparent that the Government has a compelling inter-
est in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have 
impeachable integrity and judgment." Id. 
77. Id. at 676. The Court found that "the program bears a close and substantial 
relation to the Service's goal of deterring drug users from seeking promotion to sen-
sitive positions." Id. 
78. Id. at 677. The Court held that the government's ·compelling interests in safe-
guarding our borders and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations of 
employees who seek to be promoted to positions that directly involve the interdiction 
of illegal drugs or that require the incumbent to carry a firearm." Id. 
79. 482 U.S. 691. 
80. Id. at 666. The Court held that the Customs Service has a compelling inter-
est in preventing the promotion of employees who use drugs to positions "where they 
might endanger the integrity of our Nation's borders or the lives of the citizenry." Id. 
Id. 
81. Id. at 666-67: 
Even if Customs Service employees are more likely to be 
familiar with the procedures required to obtain a warrant 
than most other Government workers, requiring a warrant 
in this context would serve only to divert valuable agency 
resources from the Service's primary mission. The Customs 
Service has been entrusted with pressing responsibilities, and 
its mission would be compromised ifit were required to seek 
search warrants in connection with routine, yet sensitive, 
employment decisions. 
82. Id. at 667. The Court found that a warrant would provide little or no addi-
tional protection of the employee's privacy interests. 
83. 489 U.S. 602. 
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ing program served as an adequate substitute for a search 
warrant.84 
B. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ACTION: 
The state has the power and the duty to protect its citizenry 
from the spread of communicable diseases.86 To accomplish this, 
the state may take the steps necessary to prevent the spread 
of any contagious disease including quarantines,86 inspec-
tions,87 and disinfection.88 
Since 1985, California law has distinguished AIDS from 
other communicable diseases by prohibiting AIDS testing 
without written consent.89 The California Legislature not only 
increased the privacy rights of the citizens by prohibiting 
compulsory AIDS testing, the Legislature provided for both civil 
and criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of test 
results to further ensure the protection of these rights.90 
84. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667. The Court found that testing program was 
defined narrowly and specifically and that covered employees are doubtlessly aware 
of the testing program and that they are not subject to the discretion of the officer con-
ducting the tests. 1d. 
85. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 3051 (West 1990): "The state department may 
quarantine, isolate, inspect and disinfect persons, animals, houses, rooms, other 
property, places cities or localities, whenever in its judgment such action is necessary 
to protect or preserve the public health." 1d.; CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 3110 
(West 1990): "Every health officer knowing or having reason to believe that any case 
of the diseases made reportable by regulation of the State Department of Health 
Services, or any other contagious, infectious or communicable disease exists, or has 
recently existed, ... shall take such measures as may be necessary to prevent the 
spread of the disease or the occurrence of additional cases." 1d. 
86. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 40 Cal. App. 242, 180 P. 644 (1919) (quarantine of 
persons afflicted with and suffering from gonococcus infection, (including: leprosy, 
smallpox, and typhus fever) held to be a valid exercise of the state's power to protect 
public health). 
87. See, e.g., In re Clement, 61 Cal. App. 666, 215 P. 698 (1923) (police detention 
of a proprietor ofa house of prostitution and the testing of her blood for venereal dis-
ease held to be a valid exercise of the state's police power). 
88. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (Supreme Court held 
that it is within the police power of the state to enact a compulsory smallpox vacci-
nation law to protect the public health). 
89. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.22 (West SUpp. 1992). This section pro-
vides that "no person shall test, a persons blood for evidence of antibodies to the prob-
able causative agents of AIDS without the written consent of the subject of the test." [d. 
90. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West SUpp. 1992): 
(a) Any person who negligently discloses results of an HIV 
test ... to any third party ... except pursuant to a written 
authorization ... or any other statute that expressly provides 
an exemption to this section, shall be assessed a civil penal-
ty in the amount not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) 
plus court costs, ... which penalty and costs shall be paid to 
the subject of the test. 
14
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However, in 1988 the California Legislature passed sever-
al bills excluding certain groups from these privacy protections. 
These bills established exceptions to the 1985 AIDS consent 
requirements for testing and disclosure by authorizing com-
pulsory AIDS testing of certain criminal defendants,91 prison 
inmates,92 and prostitutes93. 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS: 
The court of appeal in Love began its analysis with the 
threshold question of whether the blood tests mandated by § 
1202.6 of the California Penal Code constituted a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.94 In its determination that the blood 
1d. 
(b) Any person who willfully discloses the results of an HIV 
test ... to any third party ... except pursuant to a written 
authorization. . . or any other statute t}:lat expressly provides 
an exception to this section, shall be assessed a civil penal-
ty in the amount not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) 
and not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) plus court 
costs ... which penalty and costs shall be paid to the subject 
of the test. 
(c) Any person who willfully or negligently discloses results 
of an HIV test ... to any third party ... except pursuant to 
a written authorization ... or any other statute that express-
ly provides an exemption to this section, which results in eco-
nomic, bodily or psychological harm to the subject of the 
test, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment 
in the county jail for a period not to exceed one year or a fine 
not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or both. 
(d) Any person who commits any of the act described in 
subdivision (a) or (b) shall be liable to the subject for actu-
al damages, including damages for economic, bodily, or psy-
chological harm which is a proximate result of the act. 
(e) Each disclosure made in violation of this chapter is a sep-
arate and actionable offense. 
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.96 (West Supp. 1992) (defendants charged 
with various sexual offenses subject to compulsory AIDS testing at the written 
request of the victim if the court finds that probable cause exists to believe that a pos-
sible transfer of bodily fluids occurred); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.1 (West Supp. 
1992) (mandatory AIDS testing of defendants convicted ofvarious sexual crimes); CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §l99.97 (West Supp. 1992) (persons charged with interfering 
with the duties ofa peace officer, fire fighter, or emergency medical personnel by bit-
ing, scratching, spitting must submit to AIDS testing upon finding probable cause to 
believe there was a transfer of bodily fluids). 
92. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7500 (West Supp. 1992) (compulsory AIDS testing ofpris-
oners in order to protect the health and safety of custodial and law enforcement per-
sonnel, other inmates, probation and parole officers and prison supervisory and 
medical personnel). 
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (West Supp. 1992) (mandatory AIDS tests for per-
sons convicted of soliciting and act of prostitution). 
94. Love v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 736, 740 (1990). 
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tests mandated by § 1202.6 constitute a search, the court 
noted that it is undisputed that "compulsory blood tests are 
searches subject to the Fourth Amendment, not only because 
physical penetration for the removal of bodily fluid, but because 
of the subsequent chemical testing leading to the revelation of 
private medical 'information. "95 
The court next made a cursory inquiry into whether the 
AIDS tests involved a criminal or administrative search. 96 
The Petitioners contended that the statute involved a criminal 
search because the tests were conducted with the intent to 
obtain evidence to be used in criminal proceedings for future 
prostitution convictions.97 Relying on the educational provi-
sions98 of the statute, the court rejected this argument stating 
that a reading of the section without taking into account the 
educational provision was not a fair interpretation of the leg-
islative intent.99 
The court instead concluded that based on "[t]he provi-
sions of the act, the legislative history of the act and recent find-
ings of the Legislature,"loo the legislative intent of the statute 
was controlling the spread of AIDS.lol While the court con-
cluded that the statute serves an obvious and compelling gov-
ernmental "special need", it declined to state that this 
constituted an administrative rather than a criminal search. 
The court applied the "special needs" balancing test by 
comparing the extent of the privacy invasion with the extent 
of the government interest. 102 In its examination of the privacy 
intrusion, the court considered the intrusion of a blood test and 
the intrusion of a chemical analysis of the blood. 103 
95. 1d. (citing Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App.1255, 1272-73,267 Cal. 
Rptr. 666, 675 (1990». See Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
"[P]hysical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of priva-
cy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing chemical analysis 
of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee's 
privacy interests." 1d. See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966). 
96. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 742. 
97. 1d. at 743. Petitioners suggested that the search was merely a search for evi-
dence to be used in the future. 
98. CAL PENAL CODE § 1202.6(d). See supra note 9. 
99. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 743. "This argument, however, by focusing on the 
testing requirement, does not constitute a fair reading of the statute because the argu-
ment ignores the significant educational provisions of the section." 1d. 
100. Id. at 742. 
101. Id. at 742-43. 
102. Id. at 744. 
103. 1d. at 744-46. 
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Relying on a line of Supreme Court cases addressing the 
issue of compulsory blood tests,104 the court found that the 
physical aspects of drawing blood involve only a minimal pri-
vacy intrusion.105 In response to the Petitioners' argument 
that the chemical testing of their blood would constitute a 
substantial privacy intrusion,I06 the court acknowledged that 
§ 1202.6 failed to provide for the confidentiality of the test 
results by the district attorney. 107 The court then accepted 
the People's interpretation of the statute that restricted the dis-
trict attorney's use of the test results to purposes consistent 
with the legislative intent of the statute. 108 
Having thus concluded that both the physical and chemi-
cal aspects of the testing scheme constitute only minimal pri-
vacy intrusions, the court considered the extent of the 
governmental interest in preventing the spread of AIDS.I09 
Deferring to the Legislature regarding public health and safe-
ty justifications for AIDS testing of convicted prostitutes, the 
court held that the statute served a compelling governmental 
"special need" and that this need outweighed the privacy inter-
ests of prostitutes. 110 
104. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). The Supreme Court held 
that a blood test is not significant since "blood tests are common place in these days 
of periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the quan-
tity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves vir-
tually no risk, trauma or pain." 1d. See alBo Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625; South Dakota 
v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983) (blood alcohol tests are safe, painless and com-
monplace); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957) (blood tests are routine in 
our every day life). 
105. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 744. 
106. [d. at 746. The Petitioners contended that the statute involved a sub-
stantial privacy intrusion because.the chemical testing would reveal private medical 
data since the statute failed to provide for confidentiality. [d. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. at 744-46. The court noted that the aim of § 1202.6 is in part to deter 
prostitution by persons known to be infected with the AIDS virus by providing for 
penalty enhancement for subsequent convictions and that the prosecutor must have 
access to the results of the tests to enforce the penalty provisions of§ 1202.6. [d. at 
745. Stating that "[tjhe statutory scheme envisions no other reason for the prosecu-
tor to obtain or use such information," the court rejected the proposal that the district 
attorney could use the test results for purposes unrelated to the statute. 1d. at 746. 
109. [d. 
110. [d. at 740. The court noted that the legislature is vested with a large dis-
cretion in determining what is a communicable disease and in adopting measures to 
prevent the spread of communicable diseases. [d. Deferring to the Legislature's 
authority, the court concluded that "the testing of persons convicted of violating sec-
tion 647, subsection (b), and the penalty enhancement ... are means to deter acts 
known to spread the disease," thus serving an "obvious and compelling 'special need'." 
[d. at 743. 
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Once the court concluded that the testing regime constituted 
a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment,1I1 it con-
cluded its analysis with a brief consideration of the Petitioners' 
due processll2 and equal protection arguments. 1I3 
IV. CRITIQUE: 
The Supreme Court of the United States has developed a 
three part test to be used when a court must determine whether 
the "special needs" doctrine will allow a governmental search 
without the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause 
requirements. 1I4 The test evolved as a means to protect indi-
vidual privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment in the 
absence of the traditional privacy safeguards. 
The Love court's application of the "special needs" test was 
inadequate. By disregarding both constitutional and judicial 
standards designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights, the 
Love opinion threatens to deteriorate our right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
111. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 746. 
112. 1d. at 746-47. The Petitioners argued that the statute violates the due 
process clause of the Constitution because there is no reasonable relation between the 
statutes means and ends since there may be no transfer of bodily fluids in the com-
mission of an act that violates § 647(b).1d. at 746. The court rejected this argument 
stating that whether there is a transfer of bodily fluids is largely irrelevant and 
that what is relevant is whether the group being tested are members of an AIDS high-
risk group and to what extent that group threatens to transmit the virus to the gen-
eral population. 1d. at 747. The court then concluded that the Petitioners were 
members of a high-risk group since they had been convicted of a violation of § 647(b) 
from which the court concluded that it can be inferred that the Petitioners are sexu-
ally involved with mUltiple partners. 1d. 
113. 1d. at 747. The Petitioners' final argument was that § 1202.6 denies them 
equal protection because the statute contains no confidentiality requirement while 
§ 1202.1 does and involves a far more serious offense. 1d. at 747. The court rejected 
this argument on the same grounds that it rejected the Petitioners argument that the 
statute failed to provide for confidentiality. 1d. See supra notes 106-108 and accom-
panying text. 
114. SeP., e.g., Skinner v. Railway Executive's Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602; Treasury 
Employees' v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Burger v. New York, 482 U.S. 691. See aLso 
supra notes 47-52 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the "special needs" 
test and its application by the Supreme Court. The "special needs" test requires: (1) 
a finding of an administrative search (as opposed to a criminal search); (2) a balanc-
ing test in which a diminished privacy expectation is outweighed by a heightened gov-
ernmental interest; and (3) fulfillment of the three criteria established in Burger. The 
three criteria delineated in Burger are: (1) a substantial government interest must jus-
tify the regulatory scheme; (2) a warrantless search must be necessary to further the 
regulatory scheme; and (3) the regulatory scheme must serve as adequate substitute 
for a search warrant. 482 U.S. 691, 698-99. 
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A. PART ONE: ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH: 
The "special needs" doctrine provides an exception to the 
traditional Fourth Amendment privacy safeguards only when 
the government's purpose in conducting the search is admin-
istrative.lIs The Love court concluded that the state's purpose 
behind § 1202.6 is controlling the spread of AIDS. liS The court's 
conclusion was based on the educational provision of the actll7 
and recent findings by the California Legislature.us In addi-
tion, the court found, based on a United States Department of 
Public Health Service's [hereinafter USPHS] AIDS publica-
tion,1I9 that the compulsory testing provision serves the gov-
ernment's purpose.120 However, the court misconstrued the'act, 
the legislative findings and the federal publication. First, in 
relying on the educational provision, the court disregarded the 
fact that the act does not require AIDS education for all per-
sons subject to the compulsory testing under the act.121 Second, 
115. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dis-
tinction between an administrative and a criminal search. A government purpose is 
administrative when the government is conducting the search to obtain information 
to be used either to ensure compliance with government regulation or to protect 
public health and safety rather than for criminal prosecution. Id. 
116. See supra notes 100-101 and the accompanying text. 
117. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 743. The court rejected the Petitioners' argument 
that the testing requirement constituted a criminal search because it was used to gath-
er evidence for subsequent criminal prosecutions by relying on the education provision 
of the act. Id. The court stated that "this argument, however, by focusing on the test-
ing requirement, does not constitute a fair reading of the statute because the argument 
ignores the significant educational provisions of the section." Id. See also supra notes 
97·99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's treatment of this issue. 
118. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 742. The court refers to three findings by the 
California Legislature in the CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE: (1) § 199.45(a) stat· 
ing that AIDS poses an unprecedented health crisis in California; (2) § 199.4(h) stat-
ing that sexual contact is the primary means of transmission; and (3) § 199.46(k) stating 
that prostitutes who pass the infection on to their clients are a specific group of con-
cern. Id. Each of these legislative findings were passed under Chapter 1.14. 1986 
Cal. Stat. ch. 1463, § 1 (enacting CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 199.45-199.51) 
119. Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HN Infection and 
AIDS, 36 Morbidity and Mortality 509 (Aug. 14, 1987). 
120. Love, 226 Cal. App. at 743. The court took judicial notice of guidelines for 
AIDS prevention published by the United States Public Health Services and concluded 
that the testing requirement has a preventative effect. Id. at 743 n.5. 
121. See supra note 7. By relying on the educational provision of the act without 
acknowledging that the act fails to require AIDS education across the board, the court 
failed to consider whether the intent of the legislation was to prevent AIDS by two dif-
ferent means; education and deterrence. The education provision was designed to pre-
vent AIDS by instructing prostitutes in the methods available to avoid contracting 
and/or spreading the virus. The testing provision was designed to prevent the spread 
of AIDS by creating an added deterrent for HIV positive prostitutes and sex offenders 
from engaging in the illegal activity that would lead to a subsequent conviction. When 
the provisions are examined separately, the testing provision is the equivalent of an 
criminal search since the AIDS tests are conducted to obtain evidence to be used in 
a criminal proceeding if there is a subsequent conviction. 
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the court failed to interpret the context of the legislative find-
ings. 122 Third, the court failed to interpret the rationale for the 
USDPHS's recommendation for testing by concluding that 
testing serves as a preventative measure without regarding the 
distinct roles of both testing and education. 123 Furthermore, the 
court failed to acknowledge the theory which allows the fruits 
of an administrative search to be used in a criminal prosecu-
tion so long as the primary purpose for the search is adminis-
trative. 124 
A finding that the governmental action at issue is admin-
istrative is an essential component of the "special needs" 
test. 126 To ensure that the "special needs" exception is not 
122. As specified in § 199.47(c) of Chapter 1.14, the intent was to "remove the 
impediments to the expeditious development of an AIDS vaccine." CAL. HEALTH AND 
SAFETY CODE § 199.47 (c) (West Supp. 1992). The court's reference to the finding that 
AIDS poses an unprecedented health crisis ignores the legislative finding that "the 
best hope of stemming the spread of the AIDS virus among the general public" is the 
development of an AIDS vaccine and not compulsory AIDS testing. CAL. HEALTH AND 
SAFETY CODE § 199.45 (a) & (b). The court's reference to the legislative finding 
identifying sexual contact as the main means of transmission ignores the Legislature's 
finding that the virus is also transmitted by "sharing hypodermic needles, contaminated 
blood transfusions, and during pregnancy to the fetus." CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY 
CODE § 199.46 (h). The court's reference to the legislative finding identifying prosti-
tutes who pass the virus on to their clients as a specific group of concern in spread-
ing the virus to the heterosexual community disregards the fact that the Legislature 
identified "partners of high-risk groups (bisexual men and intravenous drug users) 
... [as] the main means of transmitting the AIDS virus to the heterosexual com-
munity." CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.46 (k) (emphasis added) 
The court also disregarded other important findings by the California Legislature 
regarding AIDS such as the prohibition on compulsory AIDS testing and the exten-
sive confidentiality provisions provided by the legislature. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY 
CODE § 199.22 (prohibition on AIDS testing without the subjects written consent); CAL. 
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (penalties for unauthorized disclosure of test 
results). See also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
123. Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HN Infection and 
AIDS, 36 Morbidity and Mortality 509 (Aug. 14, 1987). This publication states that 
the primary "purposes of counseling and testing are to help uninfected individuals ini-
tiate and sustain behavior changes that reduce their risk of becoming infected and to 
assist infected individuals in avoiding infecting others." Id. However, since the rec-
ommendations for reducing ones risk of infection are identical to the recommendations 
for avoiding the infection of others, it appears that the testing serves merely to make 
individuals aware of their HIV status "maximizing the benefits of early intervention." 
Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 743 n.6 (quoting CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 144 (West 
Supp. 1990». 
124. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of this theory. The 
Supreme Court has made it clear that the application of the "special needs" doctrine 
is not effected if the administrative search ultimately leads to evidence to be used in 
a criminal prosecution so long as the primary purpose of the search was administra-
tive. Because the court had found that the primary purpose behind the statute is con-
trolling the spread of AIDS, the court could have used the primary/secondary theory 
to dismiss the Petitioners' argument that the section involved a criminal search. 
125. See, e.g., supra notes 34-36. 
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extended beyond its narrow limits, this portion of the "special 
needs" tests requires a more thorough analysis than that con-
ducted by the Love court.126 
B. PART Two: BALANCING: 
The "special needs" doctrine provides an exception to the 
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment only when an individual's reduced expectation of 
privacy is outweighed by a heightened governmental interest.127 
This portion of the "special needs" test requires a court to 
identify the privacy and government interests at issue and eval-
uate the search in light of those interests.128 
The court concluded that the privacy intrusion caused by 
the compulsory testing provision of § 1202.6 is minimal. 129 
However, the court reached this conclusion without making the 
preliminary inquiry into whether the Petitioners' expectation 
of privacy was reduced. 13o This determination is especially 
crucial in an area in which, due to the nature of the AIDS virus 
and the stigma attached to it, the privacy intrusion may be 
heightened. lal In addition, the court was forced to hold that the 
126. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 743. The court merely concluded that the purpose 
of the statute was AIDS prevention without finding that the testing scheme consti· 
tutes an administrative search. Id. 
127. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 698·99. To justify a departure from the 
Constitution's warrant and probable cause requirements there must be both a reduced 
expectation of privacy and a heightened governmental interest causing the balance to 
be struck in favor of the government.ld. See also supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
128. See, e.g., supra note 47. 
129. Love, 226 Cal. App. at 746. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
130. See, e.g., supra notes 102·108 and accompanying text. 
131. The devastating effects of receiving a positive AIDS test result has been the 
subject of both legal and medical commentary. The bulk of this commentary suggests 
that an individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in this area. See. e.g., 
Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 1278, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 
(1990). Faced with the constitutionality of mandatory AIDS testing under CAL. 
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.97, the California court of appeal acknowledged that 
the psychological impact of receiving a positive test result is significant.ld. (citing Doe 
v. Roe. 139 Misc. 2d 1072, 526 N.Y.S. 718,722 (1988». In Doe v. Roe. the New York 
court denied a motion for an involuntary AIDS test in civil litigation. Doe, 139 Misc. 
2d at 1072. The court's decision was based, in part on the psychosocial ramifications 
of mandatory testing stating that "potential ostracism and psychic harm which may 
occur from mandatory testing have resulted in most experts and organizations 
including the Surgeon General of the United States, the United States 
Public Health Seryices, The American Medical Association, and most state and local 
health departments ... opposing mandatory nonvoluntary testing." Id. at 721. The State 
of California has also demonstrated concern for the psychosocial impact of non voluntary 
testing. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 199.21 and 199.22. These sections prohibit 
involuntary testing except in very limited circumstances and provide for the confiden· 
tiality of test results with civil and criminal penalties set for unauthorized disclosure. 
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confidentiality provision of California Penal Code § 1202.1 
applies with equal force to § 1202.6 in order to conclude that 
the chemical analysis involves a minimal intrusion.132 
Furthermore, the court's inquiry into the government's 
interest was cursory.l33 Exhibiting great deference to the state, 
the court concluded that controlling the spread of AIDS is a 
compelling governmental interest and that the testing provi-
sion furthers that interest. 134 
The court's failure to give adequate consideration to either 
the privacy or government interests precludes an honest 
assessment of the balance between the two factors. 
C. PART THREE: BURGER CRITERIA: 
The "special needs" doctrine furnishes an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause require-
ments only if the three criteria delineated in Burger are ful-
filled. l36 However, the Loue court's analysis failed to address this 
portion of the "special needs" test. 
The court's failure to examine whether the Petitioners have a heightened expec-
tation of privacy precludes an honest assessment of the privacy intrusion caused by 
the testing and therefore prevents a valid balancing of privacy and government 
interests under the "special needs" doctrine. 
132. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 747. Section 1202.1 provides that the test results 
"shall be available to the prosecuting attorney upon request for the sole purpose of 
preparing counts for a subsequent offense under Section 647(0 or sentence enhance-
ment under Section 1202.85." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.1 (c) (emphasis added). Section 
1202.6 provides that the test results shall be furnished to the district attorney upon 
request. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (g). However, this section does not contain the 
restriction on the district attorney's use found in § 1202.1 (c). The court found that 
the language of the statute could be construed to. restrict dissemination by the district 
attorney. Noting that "[s)tatutes are to be so construed, if their language permits, 
as to render them valid and constitutional rather than invalid and unconstitutional." 
Love, 226 Cal. App. at 745 (citing People v. Arnor, 12 Cal. 3d 20, 30, 114 Cal. Rptr. 765, 
523 P.2d 1173 (1974» (brackets in original). 
133. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 740. The court identified the government's inter-
est as AIDS prevention and stated that the control of a communicable disease is a valid 
exercise of the state's police power. 1d. 
134. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 740. The Love court noted that: 
[t)he adoption of measures for the protection of the public 
health is universally conceded to be a valid exercise of the 
police power of the state, as to which the legislature is nec-
essarily vested with large discretion not only in determining 
what are contagious and infectious diseases, but also in 
adopting means for preventing the spread thereof. 
1d. (quoting In re Johnson, 40 Cal. App. 242, 244, 180 P. 644). Considering the sub-
stantial controversy surrounding the AIDS epidemic and mandatory testing, the 
court's blind deference to the legislature seems unreasonable in this area. 
135. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying for a discussion of the three criteria. 
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Since a finding on these requirements was disregarded, it is 
uncertain whether the court would have found these criteria sat-
isfied. 136 While it is probable that the court would have found 
that the statutory scheme provides an adequate substitute for 
a search warrant,137 the question remains whether the require-
ment of a warrant would frustrate the government interest 
making a warrantless search necessary.138 In light of the limit-
ed number of situations in which the Supreme Court has found 
that a warrant would frustrate the government interest,139 it 
136. The Love court did, however, find that the government has a compelling 
interest in preventing AIDS. Love, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 743. 
137. The third prong of the Burger test requires that the testing program provides 
a constitutionally adequate substitute for a search warrant. New York v. Burger, 482 
U.S. at 691, 699. The Court held that the inspection scheme provided for an adequate 
substitute for a search warrant because it: (1) informed persons subject to the inspec-
tions of the possibility of regular inspections; (2) limited the time, place and scope of 
the inspections; and (3) limited the discretion of the inspection officers. [d. at 703. The 
testing requirement in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 also provides for an adequate sub-
stitute by: (1) informing prostitutes of the prospect of being subject to mandatory AIDS 
testing upon a conviction of§ 647 (b); (2) limiting the time, place and scope of the tests; 
and (3) restricting the discretion of the persons conducting the tests. [d. 
138. The second prong of the Burger test requires that a warrantless search must 
be necessary to further the government's interest. Burger, 482 U.S. at 699. 
139. The Supreme Court has routinely held that warrantless searches are nec-
essary if the requirement of obtaining a warrant would frustrate the governmental 
interest. See, e.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at 702; Skinner v. Railway Executive's Ass'n, 489 
U.S. 602, 629-30. The Court held in Skinner that the requirement of a warrant 
would frustrate the government interest in ensuring railroad safety. [d. at 624. 
Because of the rate at which drugs and alcohol are eliminated from the bloodstream, 
the Court held that the delay caused by obtaining a warrant could result in the loss 
of evidence thus frustrating the government's interest. [d. In Burger, the Court held 
that imposing the warrant requirement would frustrate the government's interest by 
possibly alerting owners and operators thus frustrating the deterrent effect of "fre-
quent and unannounced" inspections. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703 . 
. The Supreme Court has found other circumstances that make a warrantless 
search necessary because of the hindrance of the government's interest. First, the 
Supreme Court has found that the need for "swift and informal disciplinary 
procedures" may serve to justify a warrantless search. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 340. Second, the Court has found that unfamiliarity with the procedures for 
obtaining a warrant may serve as a justification for a warrantless search. See 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40 (school officials); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,722 
(hospital administrators); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623 (railroad supervisors). The 
Court in Skinner, found that railroad supervisors "have little occasion to become 
familiar with the intricacies of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
'Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures ... upon supervisors, who would otherwise 
have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable.'" [d. 
at 623-24 (quoting Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722). Third, the Court found that if a 
warrant would jeopardize an effective deterrent to prohibited conduct a warrantless 
search may be justified. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630. See also supra notes 69-70 and 
accompanying text. Fourth, the Court has found that if a warrant would divert 
resources while providing little additional protections, a warrantless search may be 
justified. Treasury Employees' v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,666-67 (1989). See also 
supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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is improbable that the court would have found this requirement 
fulfilled. 140 . 
By failing to address the three Burger criteria in the pre-
sent context, the court did not apply a complete "special needs" 
analysis and, therefore, failed to ensure that the Fourth 
Amendment is not violated in the non-criminal context. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The AIDS epidemic poses a formidable health crISIS in 
California. The virus has killed thousands and has been the 
occasion of hysteria, discrimination and stigmatization. The 
urgency in combatting the virus has by this time become 
apparent to all. However, the issue in Love v. Superior Court 
is not whether there is a need for governmental action. Rather, 
the issue is whether the action taken by the state of California 
comports with the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
By allowing the government to compel prostitutes to sub-
mit to AIDS testing, the Love court has permitted our consti-
tutional rights to fall prey to societal hysteria. The exteme 
urgency generated by the need to combat the disease calls for 
careful constitutional consideration of all laws passed under the 
guise of dealing with the AIDS crisis. Justice Marshall, in a dis-
senting opinion in Skinner v. Railway Executive's Ass'n, cau-
tioned that: 
140. In the Love context it is apparent that the warrant requirement would not 
frustrate the government's interest as it may have in Skinner and Burger. See supra 
note 139. The evidence of the AIDS virus in the bloodstream is not eliminated over 
time and the delay in obtaining a warrant would not result in the loss of evidence. 
Neither would the possibility of alerting the convicted prostitutes of the impending 
test frustrate the government interest. By the time the testing is ordered, the pros-
titutes have been charged and convicted and doubtlessly know of the impending 
test. Any possible deterrent effect of the statute would not be frustrated by the pos-
sibility that a warrant may alert prostitutes of an impending test. 
In addition, requiring a warrant in the Love situation does not create the problems 
that the Supreme Court found make a warrant impracticable. See supra note 139. The 
need for swift and informal disciplinary procedures is not present when convicting pros-
titutes and testing them for AIDS. Unfamiliarity with the warrant procedure is not 
a problem because the statute orders the court to direct the testing. Resources would 
not be diverted because the tests are directed as part of court proceedings and additional 
costs would be minimal. 
The only possible circumstance that is applicable to the present context is the pos-
sibility that the general deterrent effect of the statute would be jeopardized by requir-
ing the state to obtain a warrant before testing prostitutes for AIDS. However, this 
circumstance is applicable only to prostitutes who have tested positive under the 
statute, and then only if the state would not be able to obtain a warrant and if the penal-
ty enhancement provision is likely to cause these prostitutes to forego work. 
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[h]istory teaches that grave threats to liberty 
often come in times of urgency, when consti-
tutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. 
The World War II relocation-camp cases. 
Hirabayashi v. United States, Korematsu v. 
United States and the Red Scare and the 
McCarthy-Era internal subversion cases, 
Schenck v. United States, Dennis v. United 
States are only the most extreme reminders 
that when we allow fundamental freedoms to 
be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived 
exigency, we invariably come to regret it.141 
819 
Since the addition of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the Supreme Court has carved out several 
exceptions to the Amendment's privacy safeguards, but none 
so broad as the developing "special needs" doctrine. Since its 
inception, the diversity of the "special needs" application has 
increased dramatically, from searches of the premises of high-
ly regulated business, to searches of the home, and ultimate-
ly to searches of the human body. The "special needs" test 
attempts to restrict the application of the exception by ensur-
ing that it does not overreach its parameters. While the 
Supreme Court regards it as an adequate substitute for the 
Fourth Amendment's traditional privacy safeguards, it provides 
little protection for our Fourth Amendment rights. 
Rather than applying the limited protection afforded by the 
"special needs" test, the Love court disregarded both judicial 
and constitutional safeguards. In light of the Love court's 
analysis it is difficult to imagine a situation, short of blanket 
testing, which would not withstand the courts scrutiny. The 
complex social realities of the AIDS epidemic demand greater 
vigilance against such drastic measures as mandatory testing. 
141. Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n. 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989). 
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